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The religious origins of intelligence testing 
 
To truly understand our discipline, we have to see how it has developed 
historically. In the story I am about to tell, we have to see how it has 
emerged from our religious past.  
 
If membership of mainstream Christian churches in the UK continues to 
decline at its current rate, they will have virtually no members by mid-
century. It is hard for many of us, in such a godless environment, to put 
ourselves back into the thinking of the far more devout age of the Victorians 
and their predecessors. Yet it was in this age that scientific psychology first 
appeared; and to grasp its origins religious perspectives are essential. 
 
The traditional notion of intelligence that goes back to Francis Galton is odd 
in many ways. Its basis is that we are each born with individually differing 
intellectual endowments ranging from genius to what used to be called 
‘feeble-mindedness’. Between 1865, when Galton first broached the idea 
(Galton 1865), until the rise of Nazism in the 1930s, it was inseparable from 
the eugenic aim of encouraging the most able and discouraging what Galton 
called ‘the refuse’ (op.cit: 319), and what his follower Lewis Terman 
described as ‘democracy’s ballast, not always useless but always a potential 
liability’ (Terman 1922 paper quoted in Minton 1988:99). 
 
The oddity of the notion comes out in more than one way. It is seen, for 
instance, in its focus on intellectual ability, especially of an abstract sort. But 
why this restriction, seeing that one can display intelligence as a tennis 
player or craftsperson as much as a mathematician or philosopher? The 
strangeness comes out, too, in the predeterminism of this notion –  in the 
idea that, as Cyril Burt put it, ‘the degree of intelligence with which any 
particular child is endowed…sets an upper limit to what he can perform’ 
(Burt 1959: 281). But this belief that we each have our own pre-programmed 
ceiling of ability is simply an assumption, and not based on evidence.  
 
How did this singular notion of intelligence come about? What are its 
historical roots?  
 
There are grounds for thinking that the origins are religious. This may seem 
hard to swallow. Galton and his followers – Pearson and Burt in Britain, 
Goddard and Terman in the USA – are typically considered to be scientists, 
pioneers in detaching psychology from its philosophical and theological 
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heritage. It is well known that the inspiration for Galton’s 1865 eugenic 
manifesto came from his cousin Charles Darwin’s recently published Origin 
of Species.  
 
Yet not all psychologists impressed by Darwin’s thesis have been 
eugenicists. Why was Galton of this persuasion? The motivation was 
religious. His encouragement of the most able to procreate was against the 
background of a living universe which he called ‘a pure theism’ - a 
cooperative system in which men and other animals ‘contribute, more or less 
unconsciously, to the manifestation of a far higher life than our own’(Galton 
1978: 376). He wrote that ‘man has already furthered evolution very 
considerably…but has not yet risen to the conviction that it is his religious 
duty to do so deliberately and systematically’ (Galton 1907: 198).  
 
Galton’s disciple, Karl Pearson, wrote approvingly of the ‘new religion’ that 
Galton sought to introduce. ‘If the purpose of the Deity be manifested in the 
development of the universe, then the aim of man should be, with such 
limited powers as he may at present possess, to facilitate the divine purpose’ 
(Pearson 1924 Vol II p261). Burt, too, believed – in his own words - ‘in the 
supreme importance of consciousness in deciding the direction and 
furthering the progress of animal evolution’ (quoted in Hearnshaw 
1979:225). He called this consciousness ‘psychon’, seeing it as a kind of 
group mind based on the subconscious interaction of certain living persons 
with the psychic powers of the dead. 
 
If Galton, Pearson and Burt were scientists, they were scientists in the 
shadow of older religious ideas. Almost to a man, these and other early 
pioneers of intelligence were from branches of radical Protestantism that 
sprang from seventeenth-century puritanism. Galton, although not a Quaker 
himself, had an élite Quaker pedigree (Pearson K. 1914-30 Vol 1: 27). 
Pearson, too, was from Quaker stock (Pearson, E.S. 1938: 2), while Burt’s 
father’s family had deep Congregationalist roots (Burt 1952: 55). Of the 
early American pioneers, James McKeen Cattell, Galton’s first American 
follower, was from a Presbyterian family. H H Goddard was a practising 
Quaker (Zenderland 1998:16). Lewis Terman was an unbeliever, but with 
what appears to be an Ulster Presbyterian pedigree (Seacoe 1975: 2-6; 
Minton 1988: 3). Other psychologists closely associated with these men, like 
G Stanley Hall (Ross 1972, ch 1) and William McDougall (McDougall 
1930: 191), were from a similar religious background, as also, in a later 
generation, was Philip Vernon, the son of a Baptist (Vernon 1978: 303). The 
 3 
most famous person not included in this list is Charles Spearman, whose 
family may well have been Anglican. 
 
There are features of the Galtonian tradition on intelligence that mesh so 
closely with puritan and post-puritan views on human beings and their 
destinations that they make mere coincidence unlikely. One is its polarising 
tendency. The pioneers were interested in the extremes of human ability – in 
nurturing an intellectual elite and containing, phasing out, isolating or 
excluding the most backward. The puritan tradition was also founded on 
polarisation –  the small number of ‘elect’ who were to be saved, and those 
heading for damnation. There is a kind of salvationism in eugenics. The fate 
of the human race, and indeed of the larger universe of living beings of 
which it forms a part, depends on what provision it makes or fails to make 
for the intellectually gifted.  
 
A related feature of the puritan legacy, dropped by the Quakers, but retained 
by other groups like Congregationalists and Presbyterians, is predestination. 
Whether or not one ends up among the saved or among the damned is 
predetermined by God.  Commentators from Walter Lippman onwards, in a 
famous journalistic spat with Terman in the 1920s (Lippman 1922), have 
pointed to the parallel here with the idea that one’s intelligence, and the 
mental ceiling which goes with it, is fixed by innate factors. And not only 
one’s intelligence, but in many cases one’s social destination: if one’s innate 
intelligence is low, an élite education and a professional career are out of the 
question. One is fated, in terms of the social ladder, to be a ‘failure’ rather 
than a ’success’. The salvationist thought-world is not far in the background.  
 
The intelligence men were especially interested, for eugenic reasons, in the 
‘gifted’. The notion of ‘gift’ is at root religious. It is especially important in 
Puritanism, linked with its emphasis on the belief that each person has his or 
her own ‘vocation’. What God calls one to do in this life, whether as farmer, 
or teacher, or housewife, depends on the abilities with which he has innately 
endowed one. Education, of key interest to all puritans, is a process by 
which one discovers one’s innate gifts and intended vocation. The 
preoccupation of most of the intelligence pioneers, Burt, Goddard and 
Terman, not least, with education and educational and vocational selection is 
well-known.  
 
I am not claiming that all these men were consciously following these 
religious paths, only, at most, that their thought appears to be influenced by 
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their shared religious heritage. There is a further consideration which points 
in this direction.  
 
Thanks to the prominence of IQ testing in our age, we have grown used to 
associating intelligence with abstract intellectual enquiry. Howard Gardner’s 
work on multiple intelligences and Robert Sternberg’s on practical 
intelligence have broadened horizons here, but many would still go along 
with Godfrey Thomson’s comment that ‘although intelligence expresses 
itself in different forms, in its highest aspects it is always concerned with 
abstractions and concepts and relationships’ (Thomson 1947:17).  
 
Galton, Burt, Terman and other fellow-eugenicists agreed with him. How 
can we explain the restrictiveness of their position? Once we know about 
their shared religious heritage in post-puritan thinking, an answer readily 
suggests itself. 
 
The early puritans and the sects they later spawned attached huge 
importance to abstract thinking – for religious reasons. Logic was central to 
their theology. In the early days of New England, for instance, communities 
were run on authoritarian lines by what Perry Miller has termed ‘the wise 
and learned of the upper class through their mastery of logic’ (Miller 1939: 
429).  
 
Why logic? What was its attraction? The answer takes us back to the 
sixteenth century, to a French protestant logician called Pierre de la Ramée, 
or Ramus. He was enormously influential in puritan circles. He held that 
understanding of God’s universe is to be gained by beginning with the most 
abstract and general of categories, and then generating subordinate 
categories and sub-categories by a process of repeated dichotomisation. The 
more specific the dichotomies become, the closer they are to the concrete 
realities around us. In this way, this logical scheme is able to capture the 
complex heterogeneity of the divine creation. It is able to locate every part 
of it in its proper logical place, to show its dependence on the ultimate 
abstractions (Miller 1939: ch5).  
 
Nonsense though this may seem to us, for the early puritans on both sides of 
the Atlantic this system of logic seemed to offer an intelligible, and above all 
easily teachable, way of mastering the knowledge of God’s creation they 
needed for their own salvation. Among other things, it provided an 
explanation of human thinking. God has programmed the human soul to 
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work in a logical, dichotomising way, deriving less abstract from more 
abstract categories and seeing particularity in the light of the more general. 
Educational programmes were constructed accordingly.  
 
Even after the system crumbled away in the course of the scientific 
revolution, the old attachment to logic lived on. Along with the also abstract 
subjects of mathematics and science, logic had become a central element in 
an English Dissenter’s or Scottish Presbyterian’s higher education. A 
famous example of this is found in the ultra-intellectual education given to 
John Stuart Mill by his ex-Presbyterian father James and described in the 
former’s Autobiography. Here, too, logic – introduced at age twelve - was 
the pinnacle (Mill 1924: 15).  
 
Even today it still exists vestigially in the academic structures of the older 
Scottish universities. In nineteenth century American colleges it was an 
indispensable feature of the compulsory Mental and Moral Philosophy 
course taught by religiously-minded college presidents like the 
Congregationalist G.Stanley Hall. This course is now widely recognised as 
the immediate precursor of the ‘new’ scientific psychology that took its 
place (Richards, 2002: 53-4). Hall, the teacher of Goddard, Terman and J 
McKeen Cattell, was, as it were, a living bridge between the older 
theological thought-world and the new eugenic science of the mind. 
  
Against this backdrop, the intelligence pioneers’ attachment to the abstract 
and to the logical may make more sense. In the tradition from which so 
many of them had sprung, abstractness was at the heart not only of the 
structure of creation in general, but also of the human mind in particular. 
Under the Galtonians, general abstract ability comes out as one of the key 
features of our being.  
 
In its essence the traditional notion of general intelligence may be a 
secularised version of the Puritan idea of the soul. Whether or not this is so, 
when Galton first introduced this notion of intelligence in 1865, it did not 
appear from nowhere. We know that he saw it as part of the ‘new religion’ 
that Karl Pearson ascribed to him. From the evidence put forward in this 
present paper, Galtonian intelligence may well have had its roots in a far 
older kind of religious thinking. 
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